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THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax 
System Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among 
researchers, academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation 
compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
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Abstract 
 
In recent years many OECD countries have been observing an increase in middle-income 
taxpayers making use of aggressive tax planning strategies to reduce their tax. In many 
cases it is unclear whether these strategies are designed and used by taxpayers to legally 
minimise tax or to illegally avoid tax. What is clear, however, is that those that are 
designed to exploit loopholes in tax law pose a serious problem to the integrity of a tax 
system and therefore need to be dealt with in a way that restores both faith and equity back 
into the system. One issue that needs to be considered when doing this, however, is how 
tax authorities can best regulate taxpayers who may have inadvertently become involved in 
such illegal tax planning practices. Using cross-sectional survey data collected from 2292 
Australian taxpayers in 2002 (Study 1) and longitudinal survey data collected from 659 
Australian taxpayers in 2004 (Study 2), it will be demonstrated that regulatory enforcement 
strategies that first attempt to coerce and threaten taxpayers back into compliance can 
sometimes result in taxpayers questioning the legitimacy of the Tax Office’s authority, 
which can subsequently lead to active resistance towards that authority. It will also be 
shown that the imposition of harsh and excessive civil penalties for tax non-compliance 
can in fact lead to subsequent non-compliance in the future. It will be argued that a 
responsive regulatory approach that relies on principles of procedural justice may be the 
only effective enforcement strategy available to tax authorities who wish to prevent both 
widespread resistance and future non-compliance to their rules and decisions. 
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Regulating more effectively: The relationship between procedural justice, legitimacy 
and tax non-compliance 
 
Kristina Murphy 
 
Introduction 
 
Each year many taxpayers consider how they can best arrange their tax affairs. This may 
simply involve making use of strategies that allow one to legally minimise tax. For 
example, in Australia this may include increasing superannuation contributions, or 
negative gearing an investment property. Alternatively, there are strategies that may 
involve non-compliant or fraudulent activity that are most appropriately described as tax 
evasion. For example, these strategies may include creating false expenses or concealing 
offshore income. There is also a third type of strategy used by some taxpayers that falls 
somewhere between these two extremes. These are the tax avoidance strategies that tax 
authorities around the world commonly refer to as aggressive tax planning strategies (also 
known as abusive tax shelters). They are ‘aggressive’ because they seek to exploit 
deficiencies or uncertainty in the law (Australian Tax Office, 1999). Aggressive tax 
planning by its very nature involves finding ways to accomplish compliance with the letter 
of the law while totally undermining the policy intent or spirit behind the legislation.  
 
Aggressive tax planning used to be primarily reserved for the very wealthy. In recent years, 
however, many middle-income taxpayers have been cashing in on this new form of 
financial planning (Australian Tax Office, 2000). For example, the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) recently reported that there had been a proliferation of abusive tax schemes 
in the United States during the mid 1990s (Internal Revenue Service, 2004). In Australia 
during the 1990s, scheme related tax deductions were found to increase from $54 million 
in 1994 to over $1 billion in 1998 (mostly due to 42 000 middle-income Australians 
becoming involved) Murphy, 2002). 
  
Both the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) and the IRS take aggressive tax planning 
very seriously. Since 1998, for example, the Tax Office has actively moved to penalise 
taxpayers involved in abusive tax shelters. They have also moved to change legislation to 
enable them to pursue the promoters of illegal tax schemes. The IRS’s Criminal 
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Investigation Unit has also developed a nationally coordinated program to combat abusive 
tax schemes. Their primary focus is on the identification and investigation of those who 
play a substantial or integral role in facilitating, aiding, assisting, or furthering abusive tax 
schemes. Secondarily, but of equal importance to the IRS, is the investigation of investors 
who knowingly participate in abusive tax schemes (Internal Revenue Service, 2004). Tax 
authorities from around the world have also recently joined forces to try to combat 
aggressive tax planning on an international scale. In 2004 tax Commissioners from 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding to establish a joint task force to better coordinate information about 
aggressive tax planning. Hence, tax authorities worldwide are adopting a tough stance 
towards those who become involved in such practices. 
 
However, one issue that needs to be seriously considered by tax authorities when tackling 
aggressive tax planning is how they should best regulate and punish taxpayers involved in 
such activities. Given aggressive tax planning is now being more widely marketed to 
middle-income taxpayers, it is perhaps not surprising to see an increase in the number of 
naïve and unsophisticated taxpayers becoming involved. Take for example Australia’s 
recent experience. During the 1990s thousands of Australians entered into tax schemes that 
the Tax Office deemed to be aggressive in nature. In 1998, the Tax Office decided to take 
action against the taxpayers involved in these schemes. The taxpayers involved argued that 
the schemes were sold to them by accountants and financial planners as a way of 
legitimately minimising tax while still enabling them to make a long-term investment 
(Murphy, 2003). As a result, the majority of taxpayers resisted the Tax Office’s attempts to 
recover their tax debts and the conflict between the Tax Office and taxpayers culminated to 
the point where a Senate inquiry was held Senate Economics References Committee, 2001, 
2002). 
 
In an area such as taxation, the behaviour being regulated is continuous and fundamental to 
the long-term health of the community. In such a regulatory context, therefore, the goal 
should be to secure long-term voluntary compliance. How then should a tax authority deal 
with taxpayers who may have unknowingly participated in aggressive tax planning 
schemes? Is a punitive deterrence-based strategy appropriate in such a case? The question 
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therefore, is not about whether or not a tax authority should punish these taxpayers, but 
how a tax authority should punish these taxpayers in order to secure their long-term 
voluntary compliance. The reason why this question is of interest to the present paper is 
because research into compliance has shown that sanctions that are perceived to be unfair 
or unreasonable can often lead to active resistance towards authority (Ayers & Braithwaite, 
1992; Kagan & Scholz, 1984; Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003). The following section briefly 
discusses some of the research in this area.  
 
Theories of compliance 
 
Two quite different theories that attempt to explain compliance behaviour are the 
deterrence model and the accommodative model (Kagan & Scholz, 1984). The deterrence 
model has tended to dominate the formulation of public policy in areas as diverse as 
criminal justice, welfare policy, and taxation. The theory argues that people are motivated 
entirely by profit-seeking. They assess opportunities and risks and disobey the law when 
the anticipated fine and probability of being caught are small in relation to the profits to be 
made through non-compliance (Kagan & Scholz, 1984). Advocates of the deterrence view 
believe that regulatees will only comply with an authority’s rules and decisions when 
confronted with harsh sanctions and penalties.  
 
While some research supports the view that deterrence measures can positively affect 
compliance behaviour (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Williams, 2001; Witte & Woodbury, 
1985), other research suggests that deterrence-based strategies can sometimes be 
counterproductive (Ayers & Braithwaite, 1992; Blumenthal, Christian & Slemrod, 1998). 
In fact, research into reactance has shown that the use of threat and legal authority, 
particularly when perceived as illegitimate, can produce the opposite behaviour from that 
sought; these actions are more likely to result in non-compliance, criminal behaviour or 
overt opposition (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003; Kagan & Scholz, 1984).1 Kagan and Scholz 
(1984) further argue that unreasonable behaviour by regulators generates resistance to 
compliance. They suggest that unreasonableness may involve disrespect for citizens, or 
arbitrary refusal to take their concerns into account in the enforcement process. They 
                                                           
1 For the effects of coercion on subsequent criminal behaviour, see Unnever, Colvin and Cullen, 2004. 
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suggest that citizen response to such unreasonableness is likely to be weakened respect for 
compliance with the law.  
 
In response to findings such as these, a number of researchers have therefore suggested 
that attitudes and moral obligations, in addition to economic calculations or fear of 
punishment, are important in explaining compliance behaviour and therefore need to be 
considered when managing non-compliance (Braithwaite, 2002). The core motivations of 
the accommodative model, therefore, are not to punish an evil, but to repair the harm done 
and to secure future compliance (Black, 2001).  
 
Related to the accommodative model of compliance behaviour is Tyler’s theory on 
compliance (Tyler, 1990). According to Tyler, people’s compliance behaviour is strongly 
linked to views about justice and injustice. In particular, he suggests that procedural justice 
plays an important role in peoples’ decision to comply with rules and regulations. 
Procedural justice concerns the perceived fairness of the procedures involved in decision-
making and the perceived treatment one receives from a decision maker. The procedural 
justice literature demonstrates that people’s reactions to their personal experiences with 
authorities are rooted in their evaluations of the fairness of procedures those agencies use 
to exercise their Authority (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000). In fact, there is 
empirical evidence to show that people who feel they have been treated in a procedurally 
fair manner by an organisation will be more likely to trust that organisation (Murphy, 
2004), and will be more inclined to accept its decisions and follow its directions (Lind & 
Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Degoey, 1996). It has also been found that people are more likely to 
challenge a situation collectively when they believe that the procedures are unfair 
Greenberg, 1987; Murphy, 2003; Tyler, 1990).  
 
The procedural justice literature specifically highlights the importance of an authority’s 
trustworthiness, interpersonal respect, and neutrality in its dealings with others (Tyler, 
1997). Research has shown that if people believe that an authority has tried to be fair with 
them, that they have been treated with respect, and that they have been dealt with in an 
impartial way, then these three factors enhance feelings of fairness. Tyler has specifically 
shown that people value respectful treatment by authorities and view those authorities that 
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treat them with respect as more entitled to be obeyed. As people are seldom in the position 
to know the correct outcome until it is actually made, they focus on the evidence that the 
procedures are even-handed. Critics of the procedural justice view have suggested that 
people would care more about the favourability of their outcomes (for example, how much 
they stood to lose) and less about fairness when the stakes are high. Research has not 
supported that argument, however. Instead, it has been shown that concerns about fair 
treatment remain high even when the outcomes are important (Tyler, 1990).  
 
Procedural justice is widely hypothesised to be an antecedent of legitimacy. Legitimacy in 
the context of this paper will be defined as the belief by regulatees that authorities do their 
job well and are entitled to be obeyed. As noted by Tyler, political theorists have similarly 
defined legitimacy as ‘the belief within the members of society that there are adequate 
reasons to voluntarily obey the commands of authorities’ (Tyler, 1997, p. 323). 
Researchers have shown that people who feel they have been fairly treated by an authority 
regard their authority status as more legitimate; and this has been found to be regardless of 
the decision outcome (Magner, Sobery & Welker, 1998; Tyler, 1997). Tyler argues that if 
an organisation is perceived to be legitimate then people are generally more likely to 
follow and accept their decisions (Tyler, 1997).  
 
For example, in a study of authorities in political, legal, managerial, educational, and 
family settings, Tyler found that authorities draw an important part of their legitimacy from 
their social relationship with group members (Tyler, 1997). Tyler showed that poor 
treatment by authorities affected views about overall legitimacy, not judgments about gain 
or loss. In another context, Tyler found that legitimacy was important for encouraging 
cooperation with the police (Tyler, 2004). Using panel data collected from 830 New 
Yorkers, Tyler found that citizens of New York were more likely to cooperate with law 
enforcement officials if they viewed the police as having more legitimacy. Tyler also found 
that views about procedural justice shaped their overall views about the legitimacy of the 
police (Tyler, 2004). Taken together, the procedural justice research appears to indicate 
that fair procedures play a significant role in people’s perceptions of legitimacy, and that 
these perceptions of legitimacy can in fact go on to influence subsequent cooperation and 
compliance with authority decisions and rules. If this is indeed the case, then a regulatory 
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enforcement strategy that makes use of the principles outlined in procedural justice theory 
may therefore be more effective in gaining future voluntary compliance than a strategy 
based purely on deterrence. 
 
The present study 
 
The aim of the present study is to explore empirically whether procedural justice and 
legitimacy play a role in predicting cooperation and compliance in the taxation context. 
More specifically, the study will test Tyler’s assertions that perceptions of procedural 
justice affect views of legitimacy, not judgements about gain or loss, and that citizens’ 
views about legitimacy can go on to affect their subsequent cooperation and compliance 
with authority laws and decisions (Tyler, 1997).  
 
Advocates of the deterrence approach would have us believe that economic self-interest 
factors dominate taxpayers’ actions. If this is indeed so, by exploring the situation 
surrounding a real-life taxation dispute that involves high financial stakes, this study will 
be able to evaluate the importance of procedural justice and perceived legitimacy.2 The 
mass-marketed tax schemes situation discussed in the introduction was used as a case 
study to test these issues because it was a situation that many outsiders felt was handled in 
a procedurally unfair manner by the Tax Office.3 The specific questions of interest in this 
context, therefore, are (a) whether a regulatory enforcement strategy that has been 
perceived to be procedurally unjust will affect taxpayers’ perceptions of the Tax Office’s 
legitimacy in a negative way, (b) whether these views about procedural injustice will affect 
taxpayers’ perceptions of legitimacy more so than judgements about gain or loss, and (c) 
whether views about legitimacy will go on to affect subsequent views about cooperation 
and compliance. Study 1 will explore these questions using cross-sectional survey data 
collected from taxpayers in 2002 and Study 2 will explore these questions using panel data 
collected from the same taxpayers in 2004. 
 
                                                           
2 While a number of previous studies have explored the relationship between procedural justice and tax 
compliance behaviour (Alm, Jackson & McKee, 1993; Feld and Frey, 2002; Wenzel, 2002; Worsham, 1996), 
none of these studies have explored the relationship between these items, or the role of legitimacy, in the 
context of a taxation dispute. 
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Study 1: Cross-sectional data 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
A total of 2292 Australian taxpayers participated in Study 1. At the time of participating, 
all had been accused by the Tax Office of engaging in illegal forms of aggressive tax 
planning, and all had received notice that they owed the Tax Office significant amounts of 
unpaid tax, penalties and interest. The average tax debt incurred by participants was 
AUD$49 477 (SD = AUD$83 288) and more than fifty per cent of the participants had not 
yet paid their tax debts at the time of participating in the study (four years after they had 
first been asked to pay back their debt). 
 
The participants were between 24 and 81 years of age (M = 46.50, SD = 9.30), 82% were 
male, and their average personal income level for the previous financial year was 
approximately AUD$73 000 (SD = AUD$49 700).  
 
Procedure 
 
Using Tax Office case files, a 27-page survey booklet was posted to a nationwide random 
sample of 6000 tax scheme investors in January 2002. The sample was drawn using 
probability proportional to size sampling within each State and Territory of Australia.  
 
The survey package posted to taxpayers included a cover letter, a survey booklet, and a 
reply-paid envelope. The cover letter explained the purpose of the study and guaranteed 
participants strict confidentiality. It also referred participants to a free call number should 
they have any questions. Non-respondents were followed up over time using a method 
based on the Dillman Total Design Method (Dillman, 1978). Follow-up of non-
respondents was accomplished using an identification number that was affixed to each 
survey booklet, which was in turn linked to the sample name at the Tax Office.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
3 For evidence of this see Senate Economics References Committee (2001; 2002). 
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In order to protect taxpayers’ identities, the Tax Office was responsible for all mailings of 
the survey and the reminder letters. Participants who agreed to participate were then asked 
to return their completed surveys back to the Australian National University (ANU) for 
analysis. This procedure ensured that the researchers did not have access to the names of 
any taxpayer without their consent, and it also ensured that the Tax Office did not have 
access to their individual survey responses. A total of six mailings were made, and after a 
period of 7 months, a total of 2292 useable surveys were received. When adjusted for out-
of-scope taxpayers who had died, moved address, or who were incapable of completing the 
survey (N = 677), this resulted in a response rate of 43%. 
 
Measures 
 
The survey contained 271 questions that were designed to measure attributes of interest 
such as trust, perceived fairness, legitimacy, and emotional reactions to being penalised. It 
also included a wide range of questions measuring respondents’ attitudes towards the tax 
system, the Tax Office and of paying tax, and presented a number of questions designed to 
measure their tax compliance behaviour, and why they may have initially refused to pay 
back their scheme related tax debts. This paper, however, only deals with those survey 
questions relevant to six categories of variables: procedural justice, legitimacy, compliance 
(both psychological and behavioural), economic self-interest concerns (perceived outcome 
favourability and actual tax debt level), prior conflict with the Tax Office, and 
demographic control variables. 
 
Procedural Justice. The procedural justice variables used in the present study were 
designed to assess taxpayers’ perceptions about the way they think the Tax Office makes 
its decisions and treats taxpayers. The procedural justice variables were taken from 
previous research conducted by Tyler (Tyler, 1997). They were adapted for use in the 
taxation context and were designed to test Tyler’s sub-concepts of trustworthiness, 
neutrality, and respect. The trustworthiness scale was designed to test whether the Tax 
Office can be seen to be treating taxpayers in a fair way when it makes its decisions. The 
measure of neutrality included assessments of the Tax Office’s honesty, impartiality, and 
the use of fact, not personal opinions, in decision-making. Finally, the respect scale 
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assessed whether the Tax Office is seen to have genuine respect for taxpayers’ rights. An 
overall procedural justice scale (Chronbach’s  = 0.87) was constructed by combining 
responses to all three individual scales (M = 2.34, SD = 0.73 out of 5; higher scores 
represent more positive judgments). 
 
Legitimacy. The two legitimacy scales used were designed to assess (a) the perceived 
legitimacy of the Tax Office (that is, whether taxpayers felt the Tax Office did its job well; 
Chronbach’s  = 0.65; M = 2.16, SD = 0.78 out of 5) and (b) taxpayers’ feelings of 
obligation to obey the Tax Office’s directions (Chronbach’s  = 0.64; M = 1.99, SD = 0.84 
out of 5). The variables used to construct these two legitimacy scales were again taken 
from previous research conducted by Tyler (Tyler, 1997), but were adapted for use in the 
taxation context.  
 
Compliance. Braithwaite argues that both taxpayers’ attitudes towards the tax system and 
paying tax, and their taxpaying behaviour should be considered when investigating overall 
levels of non-compliance (Braithwaite, 2003). The present study therefore used two 
measures of tax non-compliance: one attitudinal measure and one behavioural measure. 
 
For the attitudinal measure of non-compliance, respondents were presented with six 
questions. These six questions were adapted from Braithwaite’s work in the nursing home 
context (Braithwaite, 1995), and were designed to measure the degree of psychological 
resistance taxpayers held towards the Tax Office (Chronbach’s  = 0.67; M = 3.73, SD = 
0.58 out of 5). A high resistance score reflects doubts about the intentions of the Tax 
Office to behave cooperatively and benignly towards those it regulates and provides a 
rhetoric for calling on taxpayers to be watchful, to fight for their rights, and to curb Tax 
Office power (Braithwaite, 2003). 
 
For the behavioural measure of non-compliance, four questions were used to assess the 
extent to which respondents admitted to engaging in real acts of tax evasion in the past 12 
months. These acts of non-compliance included whether the taxpayer had an outstanding 
scheme-related tax debt (yes or no), whether they had worked for cash-in-hand payments 
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for which tax was not paid (yes or no), whether they had exaggerated their deductions or 
rebates (yes or no) and whether they were unsure that the deductions they made were 
legitimate (yes or no). A ‘tax evasion’ index was constructed by adding up the number of 
‘yes’ responses (a score of 0 reflects complete compliance, whereas a score of 4 reflects 
serious non-compliance; M = 0.77, SD = 0.67).  
 
Both the attitudinal and behavioural measures of tax non-compliance can therefore be seen 
to be measures of investors’ views towards compliance and actual compliance behaviour 
four years after they had been initially detected and punished by the Tax Office. 
 
Economic self-interest concerns. Two measures were used to assess taxpayers’ economic 
self-interest concerns. First, the outcome favourability scale was adapted from Tyler’s 
instrumental judgement index (Tyler, 1997). This measure refers to the perceived outcome 
favourability to oneself of the tax authority’s decision processes (Chronbach’s  = 0.70; M 
= 2.57, SD = 1.02 out of 5). Second, taxpayers were asked to provide an estimate of how 
much their scheme related tax debt was (that is, how much the Tax Office says they owed; 
M = $49 477, SD = $83 289).  
 
Prior conflict with the Tax Office. Two questions were used to assess the extent to which 
respondents had a history of conflict with the Tax Office. These included whether the 
taxpayer had ever been penalised or fined by the Tax Office in the past, and whether they 
had previously been subjected to an audit or other investigation (1 = Never, 2 = Once, 3 = 
More than once). By including this two-item index in the analysis, it could control for the 
differences between those who had had conflict with the Tax Office prior to their 
involvement in schemes and those who had not (M = 1.55, SD = 0.54).  
 
Demographic variables. A number of demographic variables were also used as control 
variables in the analysis. Specifically, survey respondents were asked to indicate their age, 
sex (0 = male, 1 = female), personal income (on a scale from 0 to 250+ thousand dollars) 
and highest educational level attained (on a scale from 0 (no formal schooling) to 8 (post-
graduate degree)). 
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Results 
 
The results presented in the present study consist of taxpayers’ responses to the measures 
described in the Method section above. There were two primary goals of the present study: 
(a) to test Tyler’s assertion that poor treatment by authorities can go on to affect taxpayer’s 
views about overall legitimacy, not judgements about gain or loss; and (b) to explore 
whether views of legitimacy can affect subsequent behaviour and views about compliance. 
In order to test these ideas, a series of four hierarchical regression analyses were performed 
on the data collected in 2002. 
 
The effects of procedural justice on legitimacy? 
 
To address the first goal of this study, two hierarchical regression analyses were 
performed. The first regression analysis used ‘prior conflict’, ‘tax debt’ level, ‘outcome 
favourability’, and ‘procedural justice’ as predictors of perceived ‘legitimacy’ of the Tax 
Office. The second regression analysis used ‘prior conflict’, ‘tax debt’ level, ‘outcome 
favourability’, and ‘procedural justice’ as predictors of ‘obligation to obey’ the Tax Office. 
For both regression analyses, the background variables of ‘age’, ‘sex’, ‘personal income’, 
and ‘education level’ were entered as predictors into the first step of the analysis to control 
for demographic differences between respondents.  
 
a) Predicting perceived ‘legitimacy’ of the Tax Office 
 
Table 1 presents the findings of the first hierarchical regression analysis. It can be seen 
from Table 1 that 55% of the variation in taxpayer ‘legitimacy’ judgments can be 
explained by all of the variables in the model. As noted above, demographic control 
variables were entered into the first step of the regression analysis. To identify the unique 
contribution offered by the other four predictor variables of interest, ‘prior conflict’ was 
entered separately into the regression model at Step 2, followed by ‘tax debt’ at Step 3, 
‘outcome favourability’ at Step 4, and ‘procedural justice’ at Step 5.  
 
The two economic self-interest variables were entered into the model before the measure 
of procedural justice because Tyler claims that perceptions of unfair treatment affect 
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judgments of legitimacy more so than judgments about gain and loss (Tyler, 1997). If this 
assertion is correct, then the R2 change value between Steps 4 and 5 of the model should be 
greater than the R2 change between Steps 2 and 3 and between Steps 3 and 4.  
 
As can be seen in Table 1, the last four steps of the analysis uniquely explained significant 
portions of the variance (1%, 1%, 15%, and 38%, respectively). Inspection of the results at 
the most complete fifth step reveal that once all variables were entered into the model, only 
‘outcome favourability’ and ‘procedural justice’ were significant predictors of 
‘legitimacy’. Interestingly, ‘prior conflict’ had no effect on taxpayers’ ‘legitimacy’ 
judgments ( = -0.002, p > 0.85). This is an important finding as it suggests that those who 
have had more conflict with the Tax Office in the past were not more likely to make 
negative legitimacy judgments about the Tax Office than taxpayers who have never had 
any conflict with the Tax Office prior to their scheme involvement.  
 
From Table 1, it can also be seen that the ‘procedural justice’ measure had a positive effect 
on ‘legitimacy’ ( = 0.70, p < 0.001), indicating that taxpayers who felt the Tax Office 
treats taxpayers in a procedurally fair manner were more likely to make positive judgments 
about the Tax Office’s legitimacy than taxpayers who felt the Tax Office treats taxpayers 
in a procedurally unfair manner. When it came to the self-interest variable ‘outcome 
favourability’, it was found that this item also had a significant positive effect on 
‘legitimacy’ ( = 0.08, p < 0.001). This finding indicates that taxpayers who thought their 
outcome was less favourable were more likely to make negative judgements about the Tax 
Office’s legitimacy. This finding suggests that judgments about gain or loss do play a 
significant role in people’s perceptions of legitimacy in the taxation context. However, as 
can be seen by the magnitude of the change in R2 between Steps 3 and 4 and between Steps 
4 and 5 (0.15 and 0.38, respectively), the self-interest variable did not have the strongest 
effect on perceptions of legitimacy. In general, perceptions of unfair treatment appear to 
have affected taxpayers’ judgments of legitimacy more so than having received an 
unfavourable outcome.  
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Table 1: Hierarchical regression analysis showing predictors of ‘legitimacy’ 
 
   Step   
Predictor 1 2 3 4 5 
Age 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
Sex 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Income -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
Education level 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
Prior conflict  -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.01 -0.00 
Tax debt   -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.00 
Outcome favourability    0.40*** 0.08*** 
Procedural justice     0.70*** 
      
R2 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.55 
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.55 
R2 change 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.38 
F change 1.73 17.56*** 26.39*** 353.73*** 1682.19***
df 4, 2011 1, 2010 6, 2009 1, 2008 1, 2007 
Note. Predictor entries are standardised regression coefficients (). 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
 
b) Predicting ‘obligation to obey’ the Tax Office 
 
One’s obligation to obey an authority’s rules and decisions is another measure of an 
authority’s legitimacy (Tyler, 1997). A second hierarchical regression analysis was 
therefore conducted which used ‘demographics’, ‘prior conflict’, ‘tax debt’, ‘outcome 
favourability’, and ‘procedural justice’ as predictors of ‘obligation to obey’ the Tax Office. 
Like in the previous regression analysis, the self-interest variables of ‘tax debt’ and 
‘outcome favourability’ were entered into the model before the ‘procedural justice’ 
measure. Table 2 presents the findings of this regression analysis. 
 
It can be seen from Table 2 that when all variables were entered into the analysis, 10% of 
the variation in ‘obligation to obey’ could be explained. It can also be seen that the 
regression analysis failed to explain a significant portion of the variance at Step 1 and Step 
2, indicating that the demographic variables and prior conflict with the Tax Office did not 
have any effect on taxpayers’ obligation to obey Tax Office decisions and rules. In 
contrast, Steps 3, 4 and 5 each explained significant and unique portions of the variance 
(1%, 2%, and 7%, respectively). However, once all items were entered into the model, only 
the ‘procedural justice’ measure had a significant effect on taxpayers’ ‘obligation to obey’ 
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the Tax Office. Specifically, ‘procedural justice’ was found to have a significant positive 
effect on ‘obligation to obey’ the Tax Office ( = 0.31, p < 0.001), indicating that 
taxpayers who felt the Tax Office treats taxpayers in a procedurally fair manner were more 
likely to feel an obligation to also obey the Tax Office. The findings from the second 
regression analysis therefore support Tyler’s suggestion that citizens’ judgments about gain 
and loss do not affect their feelings of obligation to obey an authority; it is their 
perceptions of procedural justice that are important.  
 
Table 2: Hierarchical regression analysis showing predictors of ‘obligation to obey’ 
 
   Step   
Predictor 1 2 3 4 5 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Sex 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Income -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Education level 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 
Prior conflict  -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.00 
Tax debt   -0.07*** -0.05* -0.02 
Outcome favourability    0.15*** 0.01 
Procedural justice     0.31*** 
      
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.10 
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.10 
R2 change 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07 
F change 0.76 2.88 9.11** 43.57*** 164.66*** 
df 4, 1995 1, 1994 6, 1993 1, 1992 1, 1991 
Note. Predictor entries are standardised regression coefficients (). 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
 
The effects of legitimacy on subsequent non-compliance 
 
In the two analyses performed above it was found that taxpayers who felt the Tax Office 
treats taxpayers in a procedurally unfair manner were more likely to question the 
legitimacy of the Tax Office and were less obligated to follow its directions. Do those 
taxpayers who question the legitimacy of the Tax Office also have higher levels of tax non-
compliance? This question was also of interest in Study 1.  
 
As noted earlier, Braithwaite argues that both taxpayers’ attitudes towards compliance, and 
their taxpaying behaviour should be considered when investigating overall levels of tax 
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non-compliance (Braithwaite, 2003). As a result, two hierarchical regression analyses were 
conducted to explore the effect of legitimacy concerns on subsequent taxpayer compliance. 
The first analysis concentrates on attitudinal compliance and the second concentrates on 
self-reported behavioural compliance.  
 
a) Predicting attitudinal compliance (Resistance) 
 
An interesting aspect of the tax case study discussed here is that the majority of taxpayers 
involved actively resisted the Tax Office’s attempts to recover their tax debts. Four years 
after the Tax Office first took enforcement action against the 42 000 taxpayers involved, 
more than 50% of the taxpayers refused to pay back their scheme related tax debts. 
However, when also asked about their views towards the Tax Office and cooperating with 
them, it was found that the majority of these taxpayers also held extremely resistant views 
towards the Tax Office. Of interest here was whether these resistant views towards the Tax 
Office were related to their views about the Tax Office’s legitimacy. Were those who 
questioned the Tax Office’s legitimacy more likely to be resistant, or were these taxpayers 
simply resistant because the financial stakes were so high?  
 
To answer these questions, a regression analysis was performed using ‘prior conflict’, ‘tax 
debt’, ‘outcome favourability’, ‘obligation to obey’, and ‘legitimacy’ as predictors of 
‘resistance’. To control for demographic differences between respondents, the background 
variables, ‘age’, ‘sex’, ‘personal income’ and ‘education level’ were again used as 
predictors in the first step of the regression model. The ‘prior conflict’ item was then 
entered as a control variable at Step 2. The two measures of economic self-interest (‘tax 
debt’ and ‘outcome favourability’) were entered into the analysis at Step 3, followed by the 
two measures of legitimacy (‘obligation to obey’ and ‘legitimacy’) at Step 4. 
 
First, it should be noted that each of the four steps of the model uniquely explained 
significant portions of the variation in taxpayers’ ‘resistance’. Upon inspection of Table 3, 
it can be seen that 35% of the variation in taxpayers’ ‘resistance’ could be explained by all 
of the variables in the model. Inspection of the individual variables shows that three 
demographic variables significantly predicted the level of resistance exhibited by 
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taxpayers. ‘Age’ was found to have a weak positive effect on taxpayer resistance ( = 0.04, 
p < 0.03), and both ‘education level’ and ‘personal income level’ were found to have a 
weak negative effect on taxpayer resistance ( = -0.06, p < 0.01; and  = -0.04, p < 0.03, 
respectively). These findings indicate that older taxpayers, those who were less educated, 
and those who had lower levels of income were more likely to express higher levels of 
resistance towards that Tax Office.  
 
It can also be seen from Table 3, that ‘prior conflict’ with the Tax Office had no effect on 
taxpayer ‘resistance’ levels ( = 0.02, p > 0.40), suggesting that those who have had more 
prior conflict with the Tax Office were not more likely to hold resistant views about the 
Tax Office than those who have had less prior conflict. Of the two economic self-interest 
variables, only ‘outcome favourability’ was found to have a significant effect on taxpayer 
‘resistance’ and this effect was negative ( = -0.14, p < 0.001); indicating that those who 
felt they had received a less favourable outcome were more resistant. Finally, both of the 
legitimacy items were found to have negative effects on taxpayer ‘resistance’ ( = -0.10, p 
< 0.001 for ‘obligation to obey’; and  = -0.48, p < 0.001 for ‘legitimacy’), indicating that 
those who felt more obliged to obey the Tax Office and those who perceived the Tax 
Office as having greater legitimacy were less likely to hold resistant views towards the Tax 
Office. Of all of the significant predictors, however, the legitimacy items together were 
able to uniquely explain most of the variation in taxpayer resistance (R2 change = 0.22). 
Taken together, the findings from this regression analysis suggest that views about 
legitimacy may be the key to predicting taxpayers’ views about compliance. 
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Table 3: Hierarchical regression analysis showing predictors of ‘resistance’ 
 
  Step  
Predictor 1 2 3 4 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.05* 0.04* 
Sex -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
Income -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04* 
Education level -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.05* -0.06** 
Prior conflict  0.09*** 0.02 0.02 
Tax debt   0.07*** 0.03 
Outcome favourability   -0.34*** -0.14*** 
Obligation to obey   0.11*** -0.10*** 
Legitimacy    -0.48*** 
     
R2 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.36 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.35 
R2 change 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.22 
F change 4.69** 16.67*** 134.28*** 341.30*** 
df 4, 1996 1, 1995 2, 1993 2, 1991 
Note. Predictor entries are standardised regression coefficients (). 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
 
b) Predicting behavioural compliance 
 
Finally, in order to assess whether views of legitimacy also affected behavioural non-
compliance, a second hierarchical regression analysis was performed using ‘prior conflict’, 
‘tax debt’, ‘outcome favourability’, ‘obligation to obey’, and ‘legitimacy’ as predictors of 
‘tax evasion’. As noted earlier, to assess the behavioural measure of non-compliance, a 
four-question item was used to assess the extent to which respondents admitted to 
engaging in real acts of tax evasion in the past 12 months. Like in the previous analysis, 
the four demographic control variables ‘sex’, ‘age’, ‘personal income’ and ‘education 
level’ were entered into the regression analysis at Step 1. This was followed by ‘prior 
conflict’ at Step 2, ‘tax debt’ and ‘outcome favourability’ at Step 3, and finally ‘obligation 
to obey’ and ‘legitimacy’ at Step 4.  
 
As can be seen in Table 4, only three of the four steps of the model uniquely explained 
significant portions of the variation in taxpayers’ ‘tax evasion’ behaviour. Entry of ‘prior 
conflict’ at Step 2 had no effect on the model. It should be noted, however, that only 2% of 
the overall variation in tax evasion behaviour could be explained by the variables entered 
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into the model. As a result, the conclusions drawn from this specific analysis should be 
taken with caution. 
 
Inspection of the coefficients at the final step shows that ‘sex’ had a weak but significant 
negative effect on ‘tax evasion’ behaviour ( = -0.05, p < 0.04). This finding suggests that 
men are more likely than women to engage in subsequent tax evasion behaviour. The 
findings also suggest that ‘tax debt’ significantly predicted subsequent tax evasion 
behaviour ( = 0.09, p < 0.001), with those having larger tax debts being more likely to 
engage in subsequent tax evasion behaviour. The ‘legitimacy’ measure was not found to 
predict tax evasion behaviour ( = 0.02, p > 0.39), but it was found that ‘obligation to 
obey’ had a significant negative effect on tax evasion behaviour ( = -0.10, p < 0.001). 
This finding indicates that those with a greater sense of obligation to obey the Tax Office 
were subsequently less likely to engage in tax evasion behaviour four years after being 
punished. While the significant items are not contributing much to the variation in tax 
evasion behaviour, the findings do suggest that views about legitimacy might be important 
in predicting such illegal behaviour.  
 
Table 4: Hierarchical regression analysis showing predictors of ‘tax evasion’ 
behaviour 
 
  Step  
Predictor 1 2 3 4 
Age -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Sex -0.05* -0.05* -0.05 -0.05* 
Income -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
Education level -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
Prior conflict  0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
Tax debt   0.09*** 0.09*** 
Outcome favourability   -0.03 -0.03 
Obligation to obey    -0.10*** 
Legitimacy    0.02 
     
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
R2 change 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
F change 2.58* 0.28 9.41*** 9.43*** 
df 4, 1973 1, 1972 2, 1970 2, 1968 
Note. Predictor entries are standardised regression coefficients (). 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
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Path analysis 
 
One of the major disadvantages about using a series of regression analyses is that they 
cannot reveal the relationships that exist between all of the variables of interest. Likewise, 
they are unable to tell us anything about the possible causal relationships between the 
variables. In order to address these issues, therefore, the variables used in the four 
regression analyses presented earlier were subjected to a path analysis using Analysis of 
Moment Structures (AMOS).4  
 
The final model is presented in Figure 1. According to the goodness-of-fit indices 
presented in Table 5, addition or deletion of any further pathways could not improve the 
model. It was found that low to moderate levels of variance were explained in ‘tax evasion’ 
(R2 = 0.03) and ‘obligation to obey’ the Tax Office (R2 = 0.12) while a substantial amount 
of variance was explained in perceived ‘legitimacy’ (R2 = 0.54) and ‘resistance’ (R2 = 
0.40). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Structural equation model demonstrating the relationship between 
measures of interest. 
                                                           
4 The demographic control variables and the ‘prior conflict’ variable were not included in this analysis. 
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As can be seen from Figure 1, the major variable affecting views about legitimacy was the 
procedural justice item. This suggests that those who felt the Tax Office treats taxpayers in 
a procedurally fair way were less likely to question the legitimacy of the Tax Office (β = 
0.69 for legitimacy; and β = 0.25 for obligation to obey). Like in the regression analyses, 
‘tax debt’ level and perceptions of ‘outcome favourability’ were found to play little role in 
the formation of views of legitimacy. Although the relationship between ‘outcome 
favourability’ and ‘legitimacy’ was significant, the standardised path coefficient was 
somewhat weak (β = 0.08) and contributed little to the variation in legitimacy. It was also 
found that perceptions of ‘legitimacy’ influenced feelings of ‘obligation to obey’ the Tax 
Office (β = 0.11); those that viewed the Tax Office as having more legitimacy were also 
more likely to feel obligated to obey its decisions. These findings therefore support those 
of the first two regression analyses and support Tyler’s assertion that perceptions of 
procedural justice generally affect views of legitimacy, not judgements about gain or loss. 
 
The path analysis also shows four variables having a direct effect on taxpayer resistance. 
Those who believed their ‘outcome’ was less favourable were more likely to be ‘resistant’ 
towards the Tax Office, although this relationship was somewhat weak (β = -0.07). It was 
also found that those who thought the Tax Office had more ‘legitimacy’ and those who 
were more ‘obliged to obey’ the Tax Office were also less likely to be ‘resistant’ towards 
the Tax Office (β = -0.25 and β = -0.06, respectively). Finally, it was found that 
perceptions of ‘procedural justice’ had a direct negative effect on ‘resistance’ (β = -0.36), 
suggesting that those with greater perceptions of procedural justice were less likely to be 
resistant.  
 
Two other aspects of the path diagram in Figure 1 that should be highlighted are the 
relationships (a) between the debt level and tax evasion items, and (b) between the two 
compliance measures. It was found that taxpayers who had larger tax debts were more 
likely to report evading their taxes in the future (β = 0.09). Resistance was also found to 
have a significant positive effect on tax evasion behaviour (β = 0.11), indicating that those 
who held more resistant attitudes towards the Tax Office were more likely to become 
involved in tax evasion behaviour than those who held less resistant views. These two 
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specific findings are important as they have serious implications for how regulators should 
interact with and punish taxpayers.5 
 
Table 5: Chi-Square statistics and goodness-of-fit indices for the Structural Equation 
Model linking compliance to measures of legitimacy and procedural justice 
 
Goodness of fit statistics Structural equation model 
χ2 3.29, p < 0.66 
df 5 
Comparative fit index 1.00 
Goodness of fit index 1.00 
Adjusted goodness of fit index 0.99 
Root mean square 0.00 
 
Overall, these findings support those of the regression analyses presented earlier: poor 
treatment by a regulatory authority can undermine legitimacy, which in turn can lead to 
increased resistance and non-compliance towards decisions and rules. Given the cross-
sectional nature of the data, however, some may question the direction of causality 
proposed in the path model. For example, does poor treatment by an authority ultimately 
lead to perceptions of decreased legitimacy, or do those who have lower perceptions of 
legitimacy interpret their treatment by authorities as procedurally unfair to justify their 
feelings? Likewise, do perceptions of legitimacy affect compliance levels or do non-
compliant people generally question the legitimacy of authorities to justify their non-
compliance? Questions such as these cannot be answered definitively with cross-sectional 
data. The aim of Study 2, therefore, was to report the findings of panel data collected 2 ½ 
years later from the same group of taxpayers. 
 
                                                           
5 A somewhat unusual finding from the model was the significant positive relationship between ‘procedural 
justice’ and ‘tax evasion’ (β = 0.08), suggesting that those who felt the Tax Office treats taxpayers in a 
procedurally fair way were more likely to engage in subsequent tax evasion behaviour. This finding is 
difficult to explain theoretically, especially when one considers the findings reported in this study. The 
direction of the relationship appears counter-intuitive and it is suggested that it may simply reflect a statistical 
anomaly (this is due to the fact that the bi-variate correlation between ‘tax evasion’ and ‘procedural justice’ 
measures was found to be negative and insignificant, r = -0.01, p > 0.26, indicating no relationship between 
the two measures). 
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Study 2: Panel data 
 
Method 
 
Participants and procedure 
 
The data in Study 2 were taken from a follow-up survey of the taxpayers who participated 
in Study 1. In the original 2002 survey, 1250 taxpayers indicated that they would be 
willing to participate in a follow-up study and provided ANU researchers with their contact 
details.6 In August 2004 (2½ years after the original survey), these 1250 taxpayers were 
contacted and asked to fill in a 28-page survey that contained many of the same concepts 
that were measured in the first survey. Using the same procedure as the 2002 survey, a 
total of 659 useable surveys were finally received. When adjusting for people who had 
moved address, had died, or were incapable of completing the survey (N = 146), the 
response rate was 60%. Survey data from the original and follow-up surveys were then 
merged using the participants’ unique identifier number.  
 
Results 
 
Like in the original survey, the six categories of variables used in Study 2 included 
measures of procedural justice (Chronbach’s  = 0.89, M = 2.27, SD = 0.72), legitimacy 
(legitimacy; Chronbach’s  = 0.62, M = 2.09, SD = 0.81; obligation to obey; Chronbach’s 
 = 0.70, M = 2.35, SD = 0.93), compliance (resistance; Chronbach’s  = 0.65, M = 3.67, 
SD = 0.56; tax evasion, M = 0.53, SD = 0.70), economic self-interest concerns (outcome 
favourability; Chronbach’s = 0.64, M = 2.56, SD = 0.88; tax debt), prior conflict with the 
Tax Office (M = 1.16, SD = 0.32), and demographic control variables. All measures were 
identical to those used in Study 1. 
 
(a) Predicting legitimacy using panel data 
 
In order to assess whether perceptions of procedural unfairness causally affected 
taxpayers’ perceptions of legitimacy (see Table 6), two regressions were performed which 
regressed judgments of ‘procedural justice’ and ‘outcome favourability’ at Time 2 on 
                                                           
6 This process enabled the researchers to contact the taxpayers directly without having to go through the Tax 
Office. 
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‘legitimacy’ at Time 2 (Model 1) and ‘obligation to obey’ at Time 2 (Model 2). This was 
done while controlling for Time 1 ‘legitimacy’ or Time 1 ‘obligation to obey’. This type of 
analysis enables one to explore which factors predict changes in legitimacy judgments over 
time.  
 
It can be seen from Table 6 that judgments about the Tax Office’s legitimacy were 
moderately stable over time (β = 0.24, p < 0.001 and β = 0.37, p < 0.001 for ‘legitimacy’ 
(Model 1) and ‘obligation to obey’ (Model 2), respectively); those with greater perceptions 
of legitimacy/greater obligation to obey at Time 1 were also more likely to make positive 
judgments about the Tax Office’s legitimacy at Time 2. More importantly, however, 
procedural justice was found to shape changes in legitimacy judgments (β = 0.54, p < 
0.001) and people’s obligation to obey the Tax Office (β = 0.23, p < 0.001). It was also 
found that outcome favourability judgments at Time 2 also predicted changes in people’s 
perceptions of legitimacy (β = 0.12, p < 0.001). While the influence of procedural justice 
judgments was stronger when predicting ‘legitimacy’/’obligation to obey’ at Time 1 (cf. 
Tables 1 and 2, respectively) than when predicting changes in ‘legitimacy’/’obligation to 
obey’ between Times 1 and 2 (see Model 1 and 2 of Table 6, respectively), the findings are 
important because they support the contention made in Study 1 that poor treatment by 
authorities can lead to negative changes in people’s legitimacy judgments. 
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Table 6: Regression analysis using longitudinal data to predict changes in legitimacy 
 
 Legitimacy 
Predictor Wave 2 ‘legitimacy’ 
(Model 1) 
Wave 2 ‘obligation to obey’
(Model 2) 
Wave 1 measures   
 Outcome favourability 0.01 -0.01 
 Procedural justice 0.00 -0.08 
Wave 2 measures   
 Outcome favourability 0.12*** 0.03 
Procedural justice 0.54*** 0.23*** 
Wave 1 legitimacy 0.24*** ----                  
Wave 1 obligation to obey ----                 0.37*** 
Demographics   
 Age -0.00 -0.11** 
 Sex 0.03 -0.09* 
 Income 0.06* -0.04 
 Education level 0.02 0.13*** 
Tax debt -0.02 -0.02 
Prior conflict 0.05 0.06 
   
R2 0.58 0.24 
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.22 
F 70.86*** 15.75*** 
df 11, 561 11, 556 
Note. Predictor entries are standardised regression coefficients (). 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
 
(b) Predicting compliance using panel data 
 
In order to test whether legitimacy judgments causally affected taxpayer compliance (see 
Table 7), two regressions were performed which regressed ‘legitimacy’ judgments and 
‘outcome favourability’ at Time 2 on ‘resistance’ at Time 2 (Model 3) and ‘tax evasion’ 
behaviour at Time 2 (Model 4). This was done while controlling for Time 1 ‘resistance’ or 
Time 1 ‘tax evasion’ behaviour. Like in the previous analysis, this type of analysis enables 
one to explore which factors predict changes in compliance over time.  
 
It can be seen from Table 7 that compliance levels were moderately stable over time (β = 
0.34, p < 0.001 and β = 0.31, p < 0.001 for ‘resistance’ and ‘tax evasion’ behaviour, 
respectively); those who were more resistant or who engaged in tax evasion at Time 1 were 
also more likely to be resistant or to engage in tax evasion at Time 2. It can also be seen in 
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Model 3 that legitimacy judgments were found to play an important role in predicting 
changes in resistance (β = -0.35, p < 0.001 and β = -0.09, p < 0.05 for ‘legitimacy’ and 
‘obligation to obey’, respectively). It can also be seen in Model 3 that ‘outcome 
favourability’ judgments made at Time 2 predicted changes in taxpayers’ resistant attitudes 
(β = -0.11, p < 0.01). These findings in particular are important as they support the 
statement made in Study 1 that negative perceptions of legitimacy can lead to unwanted 
changes in taxpayer resistance levels.  
 
The role of perceived legitimacy in predicting ‘tax evasion’ behaviour, however, appears to 
be a little more complicated. In Study 1, ‘obligation to obey’ was found to predict a 
taxpayers’ level of tax evasion at Time 1. However, in Study 2, legitimacy judgments were 
not found to predict changes in tax evasion behaviour across time (β = -0.04 and β = -0.02 
for ‘legitimacy’ and ‘obligation to obey’, respectively). Instead, it was found that a 
taxpayers’ age (β = -0.09, p < 0.05) and their level of tax debt (β = 0.09, p < 0.05) 
predicted changes in their tax evasion behaviour between Times 1 and 2; those who were 
younger and who had larger tax debts at Time 1 were subsequently more likely to evade 
taxes at Time 2. The latter finding is particularly interesting as it suggests that harsh and 
excessive monetary penalties can in fact have long-term negative effects on compliance 
behaviour.  
 
It was also found that the ‘outcome favourability’ judgments made at Time 1 and ‘tax 
evasion’ behaviour at Time 1 predicted changes in tax evasion behaviour; those who made 
more negative judgments about their outcome at Time 1 (β = -0.11, p < 0.001) and those 
who were more non-compliant at Time 1 (β = 0.31, p < 0.001) were also more likely to 
report evading their taxes at Time 2. In fact, this analysis reveals that the best predictor of 
subsequent tax evasion behaviour at Time 2 was whether the taxpayer engaged in tax 
evasion behaviour at Time 1. 
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Table 7: Regression analysis using longitudinal data to predict changes in compliance 
 
 Compliance 
Predictor Wave 2 ‘resistance’ 
(Model 3) 
Wave 2 ‘tax evasion’ 
(Model 4) 
Wave 1 measures   
 Outcome favourability -0.03 -0.11* 
 Legitimacy -0.02 0.01 
 Obligation to obey 0.04 -0.07 
Wave 2 measures   
 Outcome favourability -0.11** 0.06 
 Legitimacy -0.35*** -0.04 
 Obligation to obey -0.09* -0.02 
Wave 1 resistance 0.34*** ----                  
Wave 1 tax evasion ----                 0.31*** 
Demographics   
 Age 0.05 -0.09* 
 Sex -0.01 -0.05 
 Income 0.01 -0.07 
 Education level 0.00 -0.00 
Tax debt 0.02 0.09* 
Prior conflict 0.05 -0.04 
   
R2 0.47 0.15 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.13 
F 37.76*** 7.49*** 
df 13, 549 13, 534 
Note. Predictor entries are standardised regression coefficients (). 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
 
General discussion 
 
This study was interested in testing Tyler’s assertion that (a) perceptions of procedural 
justice affect people’s views about overall legitimacy, not views about gain or loss, and  
(b) that these views about legitimacy can affect subsequent compliance with an authority’s 
decisions and rules. By examining taxpayers involved in a long-standing dispute with the 
Tax Office, the study was able to address these claims in a situation that involved high 
financial stakes; a situation where economic self-interest concerns were expected to be 
high.  
 
To summarise, it was found in Study 1 that taxpayers who had been punished by the Tax 
Office were more likely to make negative judgments about the Tax Office’s legitimacy 
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when they felt the Tax Office treated taxpayers in a procedurally unfair manner. It was also 
found that economic self-interest concerns did play a role in taxpayers’ views of 
legitimacy, but only a minor role. Further, when exploring taxpayers’ subsequent attitudes 
towards compliance in Study 1, it was found that views about legitimacy significantly 
predicted taxpayer resistance levels towards the Tax Office. Those with more negative 
views about legitimacy were more resistant than those with more positive views about the 
Tax Office’s legitimacy. Finally, it was found that financial self-interest concerns and 
perceptions about legitimacy predicted subsequent tax evasion behaviour in Study 1. Those 
who had higher tax debts and those who felt less obligated to obey the Tax Office were 
more likely to report they had engaged in real acts of tax evasion four years after they had 
been punished by the Tax Office. The path analysis presented in Figure 1 revealed that 
many of the relationships found in the regression analyses were confirmed. The path 
analysis also showed that taxpayers’ debt level and their resistant attitudes towards the Tax 
Office both predicted subsequent levels of tax evasion behaviour. This particular finding 
suggests that the more disgruntled taxpayers were attempting to recoup the losses they had 
incurred from their tax debts by subsequently engaging in tax evasion behaviour. 
 
Findings from the longitudinal analysis in Study 2 were supportive of the cross-sectional 
data. The causal relationships between the variables of interest were examined and it was 
found that over time, procedural justice judgments do predict changes in perceived 
legitimacy more so than judgments about gain or loss, and that these judgments of 
legitimacy can go on to influence views about compliance. However, the panel data 
differed slightly from the cross-sectional analysis when predicting actual tax compliance 
behaviour. In Study 2, perceptions of legitimacy were not found to predict changes in tax 
evasion behaviour between Time 1 and 2. An important finding, however, was that those 
who had bigger fines for their scheme involvement were subsequently more likely to evade 
taxes at Time 2, suggesting that harsh and excessive civil penalties for tax non-compliance 
can have long-term negative effects on compliance behaviour. 
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Implications for procedural justice research 
 
The first point to make about the findings is that they are broadly supportive of Tyler’s 
work on legitimacy. As discussed earlier, Tyler found evidence across a number of 
different settings that views about an authority’s legitimacy were shaped by judgments 
about the way that authority treats its citizens (Tyler, 1997, 2004). The present study was 
also able to show that perceptions of procedural justice strongly shaped views about the 
legitimacy of the Tax Office (this was found both cross-sectionally and longitudinally). 
Tyler has also shown that feelings of legitimacy determine the level of cooperation 
exhibited by citizens; those who view an authority as having more legitimacy are more 
likely to cooperate and comply with that authority. Findings from the present study also 
support this notion. It was found that taxpayers who had made more negative legitimacy 
ratings about the Tax Office were more likely to hold resistant attitudes towards 
compliance. These feelings of resistance, coupled with their obligation to obey the Tax 
Office’s decisions and rules, went on to predict tax evasion behaviour in the cross-sectional 
analysis. When analysing the longitudinal data, it was also found that negative legitimacy 
ratings predicted changes in resistant attitudes towards the Tax Office; those who 
developed more negative judgments about the Tax Office’s legitimacy at Time 2 were also 
more likely to become resistant towards the Tax Office. 
 
It was also found in the present study that judgments about gain and loss were important to 
taxpayers and that these helped to shape their views about the Tax Office’s legitimacy. For 
example, those who felt they had received an unfavourable outcome from the Tax Office 
were significantly more likely to question the Tax Office’s legitimacy. These findings may 
not be surprising, however, when one considers the context. One could argue that the area 
of taxation is very much dominated by financial self-interest concerns. In the case of the 
scheme investors, many had claimed scheme related tax deductions six years earlier, had 
received a substantial amount of money back from the Tax Office as a result, yet were told 
six years later that they had to pay these deductions back with interest and penalties. It is 
therefore not surprising that judgments about gain and loss played a significant role in this 
context.  
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The point to make about the findings, however, is that taxpayers’ feelings about the way 
they felt treated by the Tax Office appeared to be more important in explaining their views 
about the Tax Office’s legitimacy than their judgments about gain or loss. Thus, the 
findings overall provide general support for Tyler’s assertion that perceptions of 
procedural justice affect views about legitimacy more so than judgments about gain and 
loss, and that these views about legitimacy can go on to affect views about compliance. 
 
Implications for regulatory enforcement models 
 
While the present study has been able to lend support to Tyler’s theory of procedural 
justice and legitimacy, the findings of the present study also have wider implications for 
the area of regulatory enforcement. A question that was raised in the introduction to this 
paper was how tax authorities should best regulate taxpayers who may have inadvertently 
become involved in aggressive tax planning. The Tax Office’s approach in the case of tax 
scheme investors was to use a deterrence approach. The findings from the present study 
revealed that taxpayers who were less satisfied with the Tax Office’s treatment of 
taxpayers were (a) more likely to question the Tax Office’s legitimacy, (b) were more 
likely to hold resistant views towards the Tax Office, and (c) were more likely to report 
evading their taxes in subsequent years. Hence, these findings suggest that the Tax Office’s 
initial use of a deterrence based strategy was counterproductive. Not only did the majority 
of the taxpayers involved refuse to pay their tax debts for more than four years, but many 
also developed long-term resistant attitudes towards the Tax Office and were more likely 
to be become engaged in further acts of tax evasion in the future. 
 
Findings such as these suggest that in order to prevent widespread resistance to decisions 
and subsequent non-compliance, regulators should aim to protect their reputation as a 
legitimate authority. One way in which this could be achieved by regulators is to adopt a 
more responsive enforcement strategy that takes into account the principles underlying 
procedural justice (Murphy, in press). For example, in using a responsive approach to 
enforcement, Ayres and Braithwaite argue that persuasion and dialogue should be a 
regulator’s strategy of first choice, because preserving the perception of fairness is 
important to nurturing voluntary compliance (Ayers & Braithwaite, 1992). They argue that 
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a cooperative first step will allow a non-compliant individual the opportunity to change 
their behaviour and adopt a compliant position. If this does not occur, then a swift 
escalation to sanctions would be required to ensure that both parties understand the serious 
consequences of continued non-compliance.  
 
Evidence to suggest that such an approach might work effectively on non-compliant 
taxpayers comes again from examining the situation surrounding the mass marketed 
schemes issue. In 2002, the Tax Office offered many of the scheme investors the 
opportunity to settle their scheme-related debts. The Tax Office first acknowledged that 
many investors had been the victims of bad advice. For those who were eligible to take up 
the settlement offer, it included abolishing the interest and penalty component of the tax 
debt (in most cases this halved taxpayers’ debts), and gave taxpayers a 2-year interest free 
period in which to repay the remaining debt. Taxpayers were given two months to decide 
whether they would take up the offer, after which time, full penalties and interest would be 
reapplied and further legal action would be taken against non-compliant taxpayers. After 
four years of active resistance, this strategy resulted in the Tax Office receiving a flood of 
settlement agreements (a total of 87% of all taxpayers involved agreed to settle).  
 
This is not to say that there is no place for punishment of taxpayers involved in aggressive 
tax planning. Aggressive planning poses a serious threat to the integrity of a tax system, 
and as such should be dealt with in a serious manner. However, as indicated in the 
introduction to this paper, the question of interest here was not whether or not a tax 
authority should punish a taxpayer involved in tax avoidance, but how they should punish 
the taxpayer in a fair and just manner. It has been proposed that by using a responsive 
enforcement strategy that adopts the principles underlying procedural justice theory, 
regulators may be more likely to prevent widespread resistance towards their decisions, 
while at the same time nurturing the good will of those with a commitment to compliance. 
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